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CENTRE FOR HEALTH ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
The Discussion Paper (DP) Series was established in 1984 to make research available quickly  to a 
broad readership drawn from the academic community, professional health care staff and policy 
makers, both within the UK and internationally.   Material published in DP form ranges from work in 
progress, to edited versions of completed project reports, from papers intended ultimately for journal 
publication, to those which seek to stimulate immediate debate.  Hence the variation in length and 
complexity of DPs. 
 
In the past, DPs have been subject to a minimum of editorial revision, it being principally seen as the 
responsibility of individual authors to ensure that appropriate standards were met.  Since June 1996, a 
more formal system of internal peer-review has been introduced  to consolidate the high levels of 
quality that have been achieved in the past.  That system involves the refereeing of DPs in draft form, 
with any recommended revisions being verified independently by a senior member of staff. 
 
DPs are not a substitute for publication in peer-reviewed journals.   It is to be hoped that journal 
editors will recognise the nature of the DP series, and accept that this does not compromise the status 
of those papers published by the Centre which may later be submitted for consideration in more 
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Government policy announced in the White Paper is to require purchasers and providers in the 
NHS to move from annual contracting cycles to longer-term contracts (agreements). It would 
appear the original arguments for this change came from the economics literature, suggesting 
longer-term  contracts would help deal with problems of asset specificity, promotion of new entry 
and transactions cost.  The Labour government emphasises longer-term contracting as a means of 
shifting the focus of purchaser provider relations from price and activity to quality of service and 
strategic planning.  
 
This Discussion Paper reports the results of research into the extent and nature of long-term 
contracting in the NHS. It is based on examination of contracts from a sample of six health 
authorities and their GP Fundholders, supplemented by interviews with individuals from these 
Health Authorities and Trusts who were involved in the contracting process. The paper considers 
the extent to which the problems identified in the theoretical literature on duration of contract are 
likely to be observed in the NHS and the extent to which it is likely a movement to longer-term 
contracting will achieve the benefits expected. 
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(I)   INTRODUCTION 
 
Longer-term contracts or agreements
1 for health care services were highlighted in the White Paper 
as a way of creating a more stable environment, compared with the “short-termism” of the internal 
market (Department of Health 1997).    The advantages of a shift towards agreements lasting 
between 3-5 years (or even up to 10 years in some instances) were outlined in the White Paper 
and subsequently elaborated upon in the 1998/99 Planning and Priorities Guidance (NHS 
Executive 1997).   Particular attention has been given to using longer-term contracts as a tool for 
encouraging collaboration between purchasers and providers and as a means of achieving stability 
and long-term planning in the NHS. 
 
There is no technical definition of a “long-term contract” but, in the economics literature, the term 
tends to be used to refer to an agreement that covers a sequence of repeat transactions or a single 
transaction that requires a multi-period production process.  It is the opposite of a spot contract.  
While duration of contract is the key characteristic, there is no theoretical basis for saying how 
long a contract must be before it is considered “long-term”.  The Department of Health has 
adopted the convention of treating a contract of one year duration as “short-term” and one of three 
or more years as “long-term”.  We follow this convention as a working definition but note that 
most examples of “long-term” contracts in the economics literature are of 15-25 years in duration. 
 
In this paper we discuss whether the benefits perceived by the government are likely to be   
delivered by a shift towards longer-term contracting in the NHS.   We consider some of the 
economic issues relating to contract duration in order to draw out the implications of longer-term 
contracts in the NHS context.  In doing so, we draw upon some of the findings of a recently 
completed study commissioned by the Department of Health.  This involved examination of 
almost 300 health authority and GP fundholder contracts and semi-structured interviews with a 
sample of Health Authority and Trust staff involved with contracting.   
 
We conclude that although longer-term agreements are more consistent with the general policy 
drift of encouraging collaboration and joint planning, they do not address any of the economic 
problems for which longer-term contracts are normally proposed.  They may not deliver 
automatically the range of perceived benefits expected by the government and we suggest that if 
these issues are seen as important, effort is targeted directly towards achieving them through other 
means, rather than relying on longer-term contracts as a tool.   
 
The paper is organised as follows: section II outlines the benefits expected by the government 
from the current policy developments in contracting.  Section III considers some of the economic 
issues relating to the duration, form and nature of contracts, focusing on the importance of long-
term relationships.  The implications of the theoretical issues for the NHS are considered in 
section IV.  Section V presents our conclusions and summarises the implications for policy. 
 
                                                 
1  The Department of Health uses the term “agreement” rather than contract in most recent guidance.  However, 
in this paper  we use them interchangeably.  NHS contracts are not legal documents, so substituting the terms 
makes little difference. CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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(II)  EXPECTED BENEFITS OF LONGER-TERM CONTRACTS 
 
The issue of duration of contracts in the NHS is not new.   The guidance accompanying the 
1989 NHS reforms stated that the previous government expected many block contracts to be 3 
year rolling contracts with extensions negotiated annually (Department of Health, 1989).  In 
almost every year since, central guidance on contracting has encouraged purchasers and 
providers to consider the use of rolling or fixed longer-term contracts in “appropriate” 
circumstances, whilst noting that annual contracts were the norm (NHS Executive, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1996a).   Both the previous and the current government have defined the 
perceived benefits of moving towards longer-term contracts.  Whilst the previous government 
emphasised some of the competitive advantages associated with longer-term contracts (eg 
encouraging market entry by making it more attractive for Trusts to offer new services), the 
present government has focused on using them as a way of promoting purchaser/provider 
collaboration.  Despite the shift in emphasis, both expect a similar range of benefits to flow 
from longer-term contracts.  The advantages of longer-term contracts outlined in the White 
Paper were: 
 
•  allowing for longer-term planning for improvements, service changes and investment 
•  shifting focus away from cost and volume considerations, towards other aspects of 
performance such as outcomes and quality 
•  involving clinicians in agreeing programmes of care 
•  reducing the time, effort and resources expended in the annual contracting cycle 
  
This was reinforced in the 1998/99 Priorities and Planning Guidance in which the messages 
concerning greater involvement of clinicians, better planning and a focus on outcomes and 
quality were repeated.   The guidance also defined the features the Department of Health 
expect to see incorporated into longer-term contracts, which include: 
 
•  Methods for dealing with uncertainty 
•  Methods for sharing risk 
•  Methods for dealing with inflation 
•  Incentives for achieving quality improvements over time 
 
In particular, central guidance has suggested that the funding agreements within longer-term 
contracts should span more than one year, either being fixed for the contract duration or 
“related to a mechanism which can be referred to at agreed intervals during the contract” 
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(III) ECONOMIC ISSUES RELATING TO CONTRACT DURATION 
 
Although there is a substantial body of economics and law literature which considers the 
circumstances under which longer-term contracts improve efficiency, it is not immediately 
clear whether institutional conditions are such that longer-term contracts represent an efficient 
solution to contracting for health care services.    In this section, we discuss just one strand of 
the literature on contract duration, focusing on the nature of contractual relationships and the 
subsequent  implications for the form of contract. 
2   
 
(i)  From “Classical” to “Relational” Contracting 
 
Much of the Law and Economics/Sociology literature has focused attention on the apparent 
irrelevance of classical contract law for the form and content of the contracts actually 
executed by firms.  McNeil (1978) used the term “relational contract” to underline the 
argument that modern contracts are designed to maintain good working relationships through 
periods of uncertainty, rather than for the adversarial task of assigning liability for failure to 
perform.   “Classical” contract law is based on full legal protection for the parties and is 
relevant only in circumstances when the frequency of exchange is low and all rights and 
future obligations can be specified in the contract.  Non-classical contracts however have 
three broad distinguishing features as summarised by Campbell and Clay (1992): 
 
•  Flexibility: rather than stipulate price and quantity in each period, the contract 
contains rules/procedures for adjusting price and quantity over time as 
circumstances change; 
 
•  Open-Endedness: where circumstances change beyond the limits allowed for in 
predetermined rules for "flexibility", the partners agree to what in effect will be re-
negotiation of the contract; 
 
•  Extra-Legal Dispute Resolution:  maintaining a good working relationship between 
the parties is essential to efficient production.  Procedures involving legal action, 
designed to identify blame and assign liability are more likely to harm than to help 
the relationship. 
 
“Neo-classical” contracts would incorporate a degree of flexibility where both parties 
acknowledge the contract to be incomplete.  The rules/procedures used to adapt to changing 
circumstances would minimise the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.  This is necessary as 
although parties recognise they both have a degree of commitment to the exchange, their co-
operation is strictly self-interested and trust is limited.  Opportunistic behaviour is more likely 
to occur when one party becomes relatively disadvantaged over time.  
 
“Relational “ contracts incorporate the features of open-endedness and extra-legal dispute 
resolution as they focus on the trust needed for the parties to commit to an open-ended 
                                                 
2   There are many other themes and issues which arise in relation to the economics of contracting which are not 
discussed here.  Our research covered a number of topics and the results will be published elsewhere in future. CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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agreement, an acknowledgement that co-operation between the parties is essential to efficient 
production  and the commitment to finding solutions to problems that permit the relationship 
to continue over time.  These contracts would not contain detailed rules for adjusting 
automatically price or quantity but would contain provision for re-negotiation of the contract 
when appropriate.  
 
The economic models underlying the alternative forms of contract associate the classical 
contract law  with the complete information spot exchange of general equilibrium models 
where anonymity of the parties to the exchange is a critical characteristic of efficiency 
("arms-length transactions").  Neo-classical and relational contracts would reflect the 
economic structure of small  numbers (strategic interdependence) production and exchange 
under conditions of incomplete information.   However, theory yields no prediction about 
whether the latter categories of contracts will be long-term or short-term, only that the 
economic  relationship between the parties will be long-term.  Hence the importance of 
considering relationships in the analysis of contracts  and we return in section (iii) to consider 
this issue further. 
 
(ii)  Risk Sharing and Price/Activity Adjustment Mechanisms 
 
The few longer-term contracts observed in other sectors are not fixed price contracts, as costs 
and nominal prices are normally expected to change over time and in response to 
unanticipated events.  Under a fixed price regime, initial prices would need to be high as they 
would be front-loaded to reflect potential increases in costs.  If this was done imprecisely 
there would be a strong incentive for one party to breach the contract rather than continue at a 
disadvantage.   At the other end of the spectrum, pure cost-plus contracts allow any increased 
costs of the provider to be passed directly onto the purchaser in the form of increased prices.   
The disincentives for efficiency produced by such agreements are well known (Vickers and 
Yarrow 1989) and the use of cost-plus contracts has declined rapidly in industries such as 
defence where they were common years ago (De Fraja and Hartley 1996).   
 
Contracts that do not fall into either the fixed price or cost-plus categories can incorporate 
risk-sharing mechanisms which provide incentives for agents to co-operate in adapting to 
changes in circumstances which were not fully anticipated when the contract was negotiated.  
The longer the duration of contract though, the higher the likelihood that conditions will 
change and unanticipated events will occur before the contract has ended.  Such events may 
alter the return to each party and reallocation of that risk may be achieved through the use of 
price or quantity adjustment rules which automatically adjust the value of the contract to each 
party.  The economics literature suggests two distinct roles for these risk-sharing mechanisms: 
 
•  The bilateral monopoly literature focuses on minimising the use of resources to re-
negotiate contracts when events outwith the control of the parties to the contract change 
the value of the contract.  Examples include changes in the price of raw material or 
changes in consumer demand.  In the absence of risk sharing, these events would open the 
window for opportunistic behaviour.  The risk-sharing arrangement would be reflected in a 
price or quantity adjustment rule that adjusted the financial value of the contract to each Longer-Term Agreements for Health Care Services: What will they Achieve? 
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party in a way which reflected a jointly recognised “fair share” of the new contract value 
(see Blair 1987 for an example). 
 
•  The principal-agent literature stresses the role of risk sharing as producing incentives for 
each party to act in ways that will minimise the deviation of cost and demand conditions 
from those the parties would have agreed to had they known of future conditions at the 
time the contract was originally agreed.  The emphasis here is on giving each party the 
incentives to manage risk efficiently.  This implies a pricing structure that “rewards” 
efficient risk management and “penalises” inefficient management (see Chalkley 1996 for 
examples). 
 
In the short-run this distinction may be obvious--an increase in raw material prices is 
exogenous, while a rise in unit costs due to poor inventory control is endogenous.  In the 
long-run the distinction is blurred as one wants firms faced with a rise in raw material prices 
to have an incentive to change production processes and thus minimise the effect of the price 
change on profits.  The reason for maintaining the distinction when discussing risk sharing is 
that it relates to the distinction between “fairness” and “efficiency”, both of which can be 
important in sustaining the relationship between buyer and seller in bilateral monopoly.  The 
rise in raw material prices will reduce the profitability of the joint enterprise of the two parties 
even if the producer responds in an efficient manner.  Is it “fair” for that loss to be borne 
solely by the reduced profits of the producer as in a fixed price contract or should the buyer 
share the loss by accepting a larger fall in profits than would have occurred with the fixed 
price contract? 
 
This traditional view of risk sharing raises three issues that we return to later in discussing the 
NHS.  First, when the adjustment of contract value is via a semi-automatic price or quantity 
adjustment, there is an implication that the financial value of the contract becomes open-
ended.  The value of the contract for date t+1 is unknown at the time of agreement because it 
depends on whether events activate the risk-sharing rule that automatically adjusts contract 
values or if the “rewards” for successful risk management are greater or less than any 
“penalties”.  Ceilings can be used to limit the extent of upward movement in contract price 
but if the ceiling is so low it is always likely to be hit, it will be in effect a fixed price contract 
with negligible automatic risk sharing properties.  If there is to be genuine automatic risk 
sharing and if these agreements are to become binding on the budgets of the purchasers and 
providers that are signatory to the contracts, then both parties need access to capital markets, 
equity capital or financial reserves of sufficient size to absorb changes in contract values that 
result in expenditure exceeding current income. 
 
Second, it is not always obvious which party is in the best position to manage particular risks.  
Returning to the example above, it may be that in the face of the higher raw material prices 
the strategy to minimise the loss of profitability of the joint enterprise would be for the buyer 
to change marketing activity and promote a redesigned product that used fewer of the more 
expensive raw materials.  Where this situation is likely to arise, ex ante allocation of risk may 
be inefficient and what is needed is a means of encouraging co-operative behaviour. 
 CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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Third, if theory suggests that risk-sharing adjustments to contract values may contribute to 
efficient performance, would we expect to observe these principles being applied in the public 
sector?  To apply these risk-sharing rules across the years may not be consistent with annual, 
cash limited budget allocations where the real change from one year to the next is 
unpredictable and failure to balance the budget may be penalised.  In other words, the public 
sector
3.  The historic argument against allowing public sector organisations malleable budgets 
centred on a perception of the incentive structure of the public sector.  It has been argued that 
because public sector organisations cannot go bankrupt, individuals have an incentive to be 
“over optimistic” in forecasting the future outcome of present plans.  A budgetary regime that 
does not allow a unit to obtain funds now against some future expected outcome is designed 
to minimise the social cost of this behaviour.  These rules can appear silly when say, a school 
cannot obtain additional capital for new central heating boilers and offset the capital cost 
against future saving on heating bills.  However, the Treasury does not tend to believe a 
public sector organisation when managers say that if only they are allowed to spend more 
now, they will find savings in the future.  One therefore observes that virtually all budgets for 
production of public sector goods and services are for one year only and cash limited, with 
very little temporal virement.  This reflects the presumption that on average such limited 
budgetary flexibility will produce more efficient outcomes than would be the case in the 
absence of such a rule.    
 
In June of this year the Chancellor announced that, following the Comprehensive Spending 
Review, government Departments would have budgets set for each of the next three years 
(HM Treasury 1998).  The intention is to break with the tradition of an annual public 
expenditure round where Departments bid against each other (and against the Treasury) for 
incremental resources.  There has been no suggestion that the statutory requirement for Trusts 
to break-even on an annual basis is to be changed though there has been a marginal increase 
in the amount of any “underspend” that can be carried forward into the next financial year.  
There has been no mention of granting a power to spend in excess of the budget for the 
current financial year in anticipation of funding to be made available in the following 
financial year.  The degree to which a three year public expenditure cycle will genuinely 
reduce uncertainty for Health Authorities and Trusts about their income over a 3-5 year 
period will only be apparent after the system has operated for several years.  However, it is 
difficult to believe that budgets will not continue to be affected by the same sort of policy 
initiatives that we currently see announced during each financial year which are often 
accompanied by changes in finance.  Examples from the past year would include initiatives to 
deal with winter pressures, waiting lists and breast cancer. 
 
The approach to risk sharing agreed by the parties to a contract will be reflected in the 
price/quantity adjustment mechanisms they adopt.  Adjustment mechanisms which tackle the 
issue of changing the financial value of a contract over time can be classified as re-
determination or re-negotiation provisions (Crocker and Masten 1991).  The former 
                                                 
3   This is not to imply that the financial regime of the private sector will always accommodate variable priced 
contracts.  Firms reliant on bank finance with little equity capital would not be able to enter into such contracts.  The 
rarity of examples of private sector contracts with long-term price-adjustment rules suggests the problem may simply 
be relatively more serious in the public sector. Longer-Term Agreements for Health Care Services: What will they Achieve? 
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establishes prices by a formula which takes the form of either a “definite” or “indefinite” 
price escalator.  Definite price escalators allow for predetermined increases in price and are 
fairly uncommon in longer-term contracts as they do not allow consideration of changes in 
factors thought to influence price and they therefore do not incorporate much flexibility.   
Indefinite escalators specify the process by which price changes are to be agreed, usually 
linking contract prices to changes in the price of variables which are agreed to be indicative of 
general changes in market conditions.  At the simplest level, contract value could be linked to 
the market price of the good, but this assumes the good is homogenous and that there is a spot 
market with which to make price comparisons.  Another variation would link contract price to 
changes in the price of substitute goods, hence reflecting opportunity cost (eg the price of gas 
linked to the price of oil).  Finally, “cost-plus” mechanisms adjust the contract value to reflect 
changes in the costs facing the supplier, but may not provide good incentives for efficiency.   
As the contractual environment becomes more complex or uncertain and thus it gets difficult 
or costly to obtain and certify information about the future environment, re-determination 
clauses will become difficult to design and enforce.  Re-negotiation then becomes the norm 
and parties will not set out in advance how agreements on prices will be reached but, they will 
negotiate mutually acceptable terms each time a change in circumstances arises.    
 
This analysis suggests that when examining contracts in the NHS we want to know if there 
are differences in the mechanisms used to allocate risks in long and short-term contracts, 
whether some mechanisms appear to be more successful than others and whether the financial 
regime of the public sector affects the approach to risk sharing. 
 
(iii) Contracts and relationships in the private sector 
 
There has been a tendency to identify "relational contracts" with long-term contracts on the 
grounds that in a world of incomplete information, long-term relationships are likely to be 
more profitable than "arms-length" transacting.   Trust and reputation play a greater role in 
contractual arrangements that are repeated over time and thus the hypothesis that long-term 
relationships are likely to be more efficient is probably correct.  However, it is not  the case 
that long-term relationships necessarily involve longer-term contracts.   In the economic 
analysis of contract the critical distinction is whether anonymous/ arms-length transactions 
are likely to produce outcomes as efficient as co-operation between transactors who recognise 
their mutual dependence.   If co-operation is expected to be more efficient, we would predict 
its emergence irrespective of duration of contract: we are as likely to see the relevant 
behaviour where the world is one without formal contract, with short-term contracts or with 
long-term contracts.    
 
In much of the private sector, the duration of contracts seems to be less of an issue than the 
duration of relationships.   The most recent published study of contract duration in the private 
sector examined contracts amongst  firms in the engineering and kitchen furniture industries 
in three countries  (Arighetti et al 1997).   The majority of all firms had long-term 
relationships with their largest customers - 80% of  British firms had been dealing with their 
largest customer for more than five years and almost 40% for more than twenty years.   
However, rather than having long-term contracts with guarantees of future price and quantity 
built in, most firms tended to contract on a short-term basis either order by order or through a CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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“framework” or “requirements” contract under which buyers place orders as required.  The 
British firms in particular, placed a high degree of emphasis on personal contacts and 
informal understandings of the basis on which they conduct their business.  The authors state 
that:  
 
“a commonly expressed view was that the success of the relationship depended on how well 
the exchange proceeded from the point of view of the parties, not on the form of the 
agreement”.   
 
They quote a UK supplier as saying:  
 
”we don’t have long-term contracts.  We do have long-term relationships” and 
 “long-term relationships have very little to do with pieces of paper”.    
 
Many firms saw advantages in retaining the flexibility of short-term contracts and stressed 
some of the difficulties of making firm guarantees in the longer-term (eg changing demand, 
price fluctuations, one-off projects).  However, although the majority were happy to have 
shorter contracts within the framework of a long-term relationship, a small number did see 
some advantages in having long-term contracts with guaranteed volume, mainly in terms of 
allowing them to make firm commitments in buying supplies.  This was seen as particularly 
important when the supplier operated in a volatile and competitive market.  In the context of 
the NHS, this is unlikely to apply to many Trusts in terms of their relationships with their 
main purchaser as the majority of their income will be more or less guaranteed.  However, of 
more relevance was the view that long-term relationships  were important as a means of 
focusing on product quality, innovation and development.   Longer-term framework 
agreements (which do not commit finance) were seen as one way of developing such a focus. 
 
Research on private sector contracting has shown that the nature of contracts and of 
contractual relationships is influenced heavily by the social and institutional environment.  
Many studies have shown how extra-legal sanctions, unwritten rules, social pressures and 
norms are used to manage relationships based on trust and reputation, rather than reliance on 
rigid contract terms (eg Macaulay 1963, Beale and Dugdale 1975; Burchell and Wilkinson 
1996, Arighetti et al 1997). 
 
This strand of analysis suggests that rather than being considered in isolation, the issue of 
contract duration in the NHS should be viewed within the context of the relationships 
between purchasers and providers.  In the NHS, does the form and content of the contract 
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(IV)  IMPLICATIONS FOR LONGER-TERM CONTRACTS IN THE NHS 
 
(i)  Duration of NHS contracts 
 
There appears to be some confusion about the prevalence of longer-term contracts in the 
NHS.  The Department of Health has reported that despite the absence of  official obstacles to 
prevent parties entering into longer-term contracts, the annual contracting cycle has been 
dominant and the “vast majority of contracts are for one year” (NHS Executive 1996).  Hence 
the central guidance aimed at encouraging purchasers and providers to use longer-term 
contracts more frequently.  However, some survey evidence has suggested that purchasers 
and providers were already using longer-term contracts (Raftery  et al 1996).  We offer an 
explanation for this apparent confusion in section V.  As stated in the introductory section of 
this paper, there is no technical definition of a long-term contract.  For our empirical work we 
adopted the Department of Health convention of treating a contract of three or more years as 
“long-term”. 
 
In our sample of 106 contracts from six Health Authorities,
4 we found that the majority of 
contracted activity in five of the Health Authorities is currently organised under agreements 
spanning three years.   In these Health Authorities, where annual contracts are used, they tend 
to be for small sums and with providers outside the authority boundary.  All the Health 
Authorities with longer-term contracts stated that they had been using them for some time and 
not as a response to the more recent policy announcements.  The other Health Authority 
currently uses annual contracts with all providers but expects to be moving towards three year 
agreements the following year.    In the sample of five contracts supplied by the NHS 
Executive, three covered a three year period, one a two year period and one a five year period.  
The latter was written to ring fence resources at a mental health Trust to affect the transfer of 
patients with learning difficulties into the community over this period.  Tables 1 and 2 
summarise the findings.  Of the 177 contracts from GP fundholders, only one specified a 
duration of more than one year.  
 
(ii)  Risk Handling in the NHS and Price/Adjustment Mechanisms  
 
Despite the fact that the majority of patient activity was included in three year contracts, the 
financial value of these contracts was almost always re-negotiated annually.   The legal 
obligation of Trusts to break even each financial year is reflected in the contracts in the form 
of highly detailed rules for adjusting and re-negotiating activity in-year and for adjusting 
contract values. These clauses are designed to help both the purchasers and providers stay within 
their annual budget constraints.  They inform the parties of the adjustments that are acceptable 
when conditions change  (e.g. reduce elective work if an increase in emergency work would 
otherwise threaten to breach total cost agreements).  While these triggers for adjustment of 
contract value within year were common for acute services, within our sample of contracts  there 
were few examples of rules for automatic adjustment of contract price between years.   Table 3 
summarises the details of just 3 longer-term contracts (all from the sample of 5 provided by the 
NHS Executive) which contained rules for adjusting contract value across years. 
                                                 
4 See annex 1 for description of the sample CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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The NHS Priorities and Planning Guidance 1998/99 makes it clear that the Department wants to 
see contracts moving away from providing for annual negotiation of finance and activity to 3-5 
year agreements on finance.  It does not say how this is to be done, only that: 
 
 “the funding agreement is either fixed or related to a mechanism which can be referred to at 
agreed intervals during the contract.”   
 
A fixed price agreement would not be consistent with the argument in the same Guidance for 
more risk sharing.  It therefore appears that the guidance is referring to re-determination 
mechanisms like those found in some of the long-term contracts in the energy sector that have 
been reported in the research literature - for example: 
 
“the purchaser agrees to automatically adjust payment in line with changes in spot gas prices 
within the limits of +/-4% of prices at the date of signing the contract; if prices go outside the 
limits, the terms of the contract are to be re-negotiated.” 
 
This is very similar to the wording of existing NHS contracts where floors, ceilings and triggers 
operate within year to manage annual contract value.  Extending this type of “automatic” price 
adjustment mechanism between years would only contribute to the objective of “reducing time 
spent” each year negotiating finance if the ceilings and floors were rarely reached and the 
likelihood that the parties would have to meet to re-negotiate was thus reduced. 
 
At present the annual re-negotiation of contract finance centres on: 
 
•  The change in the purchaser’s budget which will be composed of any change in the 
formula allocation from the region, any inflation allowance, any real growth and any 
additional funding for specific services (all determined on an annual basis by the 
Treasury, Department of Health and Region); 
 
•  “Cost pressures” of providers which can be (roughly) decomposed into (i) 
legislation/government policy changes (ii) changes in costs of usual activities and (iii) 
new developments favoured by providers; 
 
•  Purchaser priorities for new developments. 
 
In almost all cases one is looking at quite small changes in year on year expenditure for a main 
contract.  Except where there has been prior agreement to move a block of services, the annual 
local negotiations between a purchaser and each of their providers centre on how to divide the 
change in revenue between providers to deal with cost changes of existing services (which are 
likely to differ by provider) and how much can be invested in new developments with different 
providers. Trying to distinguish between changes in the cost of existing services and new 
developments in the acute sector was the most frequently cited problem of the annual financial 
negotiation. 
 
The annual financial margins of change are so small they create apparently contradictory 
messages for those who want longer-term financial agreements.  First, for all main contracts, it Longer-Term Agreements for Health Care Services: What will they Achieve? 
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would be easy to draft contracts that guaranteed, say, 95% of the current budget of £Xm for each 
of the next five years.  This might look more like a longer-term financial agreement than the 
present contracts but would in fact represent no change.  The annual negotiations are not about 
moving large parts of contracts but about the allocation of any extra money allowed by the 
Treasury each year.  The second implication of the annual negotiations being over marginal 
resources is that small numbers are of disproportionate importance - the ability to redirect 0.5% of 
the budget is the only way a purchaser may have of beginning to alter the pattern of service 
development and delivery.  A Trust deficit of 0.5% of the budget is treated as evidence of serious 
financial difficulty unless a feasible recovery plan is in place.  With margins this tight, neither 
party is usually willing to commit themselves to pricing rules that would remove the discretion to 
negotiate marginal expenditure and revenue each year.   
 
All purchasers said they could live with a pricing rule that automatically gave providers the 
national inflation adjustment but only one purchaser was willing to go further and offer all 
providers an increase equal to the total increase in the Health Authority budget. This is the only 
contract pricing rule that would serve the purpose of eliminating annual re-negotiation of contract 
prices. All the other purchasers felt strongly that growth money was there to implement purchaser 
priorities and not to simply be handed over to finance provider priorities.  It is worth noting that 
the purchasers with the strongest commitment to strategic planning and those involved with Trusts 
in metropolitan service “reconfigurations” were the most likely to oppose a pricing rule that 
automatically gave providers a percentage of any growth money.   
 
From interviews it was clear that contracting parties have developed some mechanisms to 
improve the management of the risks they face and thus reduce the “hassle” of annual financial 
agreement but none saw the possibility of reducing them to pricing rules that could be 
incorporated into 3-5 year financial agreements.  In one Health Authority they had worked out a 
matrix of relevant costs that allowed a provider to alter within year case-mix without coming back 
for additional funding.  Another Health Authority is trying to develop more robust definitions of 
cost pressures in order to further separate discussion of cost changes from new developments.  For 
that authority, a cost pressure is a change in the cost of a service that is not associated with a 
change in quality or quantity.  This would make a pay increase or a change in junior doctor hours 
a cost pressure but the introduction of a new drug with improved therapeutic properties for 
treating an already treated condition, a new development.  In these circumstances it is not clear 
what the Planning and Priorities Guidance means by “risk sharing” and “managing risks”.  In the 
academic literature, the first term is used to indicate that the Health Authority would pay for part 
of the change in cost and the Trust would pay for the other part.  Incentives are strengthened as 
neither party’s budget would bear the full burden of the change in staff costs or the cost of 
introducing the new treatment.  However, Health Authorities are cash limited public sector 
organisations.  The only way they can “share” the cost with a Trust is to reduce their reserves or 
forego preferred service developments elsewhere.  In the US literature on risk sharing, the 
assumption is that the payer (the employer or government) agrees to depart from strict capitation 
payment and adjusts payment to partly reflect actual costs (see Frank et al 1995) for an example 
of “soft capitation”).  A Health Authority is not in a position to do this across all providers. 
 
Public sector budgets, cash limited for each financial year, ordinarily contain a “contingency 
reserve”.  The contingency reserve is an important mechanism for managing within year financial 
risk so as not to breach the annual cash limit but such reserves are not useful for carrying risk 
between years.  The tradition within the public sector has been to approach risk sharing in a CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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discretionary, rather than a rule based, way.  Each tier holds back part of its fixed budget as a 
contingency reserve before passing the remainder on to the next tier.  When unforeseen events 
arise, the higher tier decides, often on an ad hoc basis, whether and on what terms to contribute to 
the financial problems of the unit below.  In several interviews, individuals pointed out that each 
year there was not only uncertainty about their formal allocation of funds between years but even 
more uncertainty about the various forms of non-recurrent funding that might be made available 
during the year by regional offices--in effect, their receipts from the Regional, Departmental, and 
Treasury contingency reserves. 
 
(iii)  Contractual Relationships in the NHS 
 
Contracts between NHS purchasers and providers are not legally binding and are legally 
enforceable only if they involve a private sector provider (Allen, 1995).  Disputes are dealt 
with not through the courts but rather through internal arbitration or conciliation processes at 
a regional level, with the Secretary of State acting as final conciliator in pre or post contract 
disputes (NHS Executive 1991).  The latter option has rarely been used in practice (Mchale et 
al 1995).    On the surface, they thus appear to bear similarities to the form of relational 
contracts outlined earlier.  However, there may be some question about the degree to which 
the form of the contract corresponds to the reality of the nature of the relationships between 
parties in the NHS as the latter may not necessarily be based on goodwill and trust between 
parties. 
 
Each individual interviewed was asked what they understood by the term long-term contract.  
While two people said anything longer than one year was a long-term contract, the 
overwhelming majority said that as long as finance was negotiated on an annual basis, their 
contracts were short-term.  One Trust executive (who had previously worked in the Health 
Authority) referred to their three year contracts as “a sham”.  He argued that the three year 
contracts were there to show commitment but both parties already know they must continue 
to work together.  Others felt there was some value in “showing commitment” but agreed that 
the annual cycle of agreeing finance and activity was what most parties considered the core of 
contracting.  When asked whether her contracts were long or short-term, one contract 
manager replied she thought it an irrelevant question as the relationship with her main 
purchaser was obviously long-term.  “Where else can they go?”.  The duration of the contract 
did not matter. 
 
It is not clear that acknowledging the relationship as long-term was likely to engender the co-
operative relationship discussed in the relational contracting literature.  The perception of 
those negotiating on behalf of the Health Authority  often saw Trusts as trying on everything 
to increase their share of resources; Trusts often felt they had a right to a “fair-share” of any 
growth money received by the Health Authority irrespective of whether the Health 
Authority’s priorities differed from  those of the Trust.  There was a total absence of 
agreement as to what constituted “fair shares” of the resources annually made available by the 
Department of Health. 
 
It has been argued that long-term contracts would reduce uncertainty where services were to 
be restructured.   Our research suggested that Health Authorities and Trusts often develop Longer-Term Agreements for Health Care Services: What will they Achieve? 
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non-contractual frameworks to agree and implement policies of service development and 
structural change.  It would appear a matter of indifference, or more likely of local 
convenience, whether these arrangements were referred to or included in contract 
documentation.  Taking the contracts of the six Health Authorities as a whole,  there was 
considerable variation in what people in different Health Authorities considered relevant to 
include in the paperwork of the contract as opposed to appearing in other documents.  For 
example, one Health Authority had a five year rolling strategic plan and each year particular 
points for action were agreed with each of their contracting Trusts.  Neither the strategy nor 
the points for action during the current year appeared in contracts.  Another Health Authority 
included the equivalent strategic points for action within the contract documentation.  In both 
cases the parties to the contracts had planning periods longer than the duration of their 
contracts and significantly longer than the annual re-negotiation of the financial value of the 
contracts. 
 
Several interviewees said they did not see contracts as the appropriate place for detail of their 
strategic plans.  In future they expect to put this information in the local Health Improvement 
plan, not in a longer-term contract/agreement.  This view of the rather limited role of contract 
occasionally emerged when discussing service specifications.  In some contracts service 
specifications were  no more than lists of procedures, in others one found detailed clinical 
protocols included as service specifications.  The same contract would have highly detailed 
service specifications for some services but not for others.  A number of those interviewed 
treated service specifications as marginal or irrelevant to contracting.  In one Health Authority 
where effort went into producing a complete set of service specifications three years ago, they 
are now ignored.  If a problem arises, the clinicians sort it out with the Health Authority.  It 
was considered that achieving change in clinical practice was an ongoing process of dialogue 
- “an organic process”.  The important thing was to work out care pathways and protocols 
with clinicians: 
 
 “pulling all this together in a service specification is bureaucratic.”  
 
The contracting process was seen as peripheral to the process of raising clinical standards and 
moving to longer-term contracts would make no difference.  The Government would appear 
to share this view as they are proposing to establish national institutions such as the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and Commission for Health Improvement (CHIMP) 
as the key instruments for bringing about changes in clinical standards.  
  CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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(V)  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The lack of longer-term financial agreements coupled with frequent use of longer-term 
frameworks for planning investment and service developments is probably at the root of the 
confusion about the extent to which long-term contracts are used in the NHS.  It was clear 
from our interviews with Health Authority and Trust staff that contracting was seen as a very 
narrow financial activity.  To them a longer-term contract is one that settles financial 
arrangements for a period of three years of more.  Long-term planning and strategy are not 
necessarily carried out within this narrow contracting framework and our research indicated 
that in most cases parties to NHS contracts had planning periods longer than the duration of 
their contracts and significantly longer than the annual round of financial re-negotiation.  Four 
to five year financial frameworks were used to explore the financial implications of service 
development strategies.  Five year, and in one case a ten year, investment planning horizon 
was used where purchasers and providers were negotiating changes in infrastructure.  Use of 
longer-term plans for investment and service development was not inconsistent with annual 
re-negotiation of prices and activity.  Most of the expected benefits of a move to longer-term 
contracts (summarised on p.5) are at present being realised by use of arrangements other 
contracts.  We found no evidence to support the view that a movement to longer-term 
contracts with financial re-determination clauses, the proposed change that would  be 
significantly different from present practice, would contribute to the objectives of better 
planning, more clinician involvement and improved clinical standards. 
 
Economic theory and the evidence from the NHS suggest there is limited scope for revising 
the current longer-term agreements to incorporate re-determination clauses which adjust price 
and activity automatically over time.  Changes in contract value are currently achieved via 
annual re-negotiation and this is appropriate within the current financial system with its stress 
on annually balanced budgets and cash limits.  A three year expenditure cycle for central 
government departments may reduce some uncertainty for Health Authorities as to their 
budgets for the next three years but a firm three year budget for the Department of Health 
does not mean a firm three year budget for a Health Authority.  The most obvious sources of 
change would be changes to the capitation formula, changes in the proportion of funds 
distributed by criteria other than capitation and new policy initiatives from the Department of 
Health.  Trusts face even more sources of income variation as purchasing budgets are 
devolved to Primary Care Groups. 
 
When trying to assess the impact of moving to a three year public expenditure round it is 
useful to distinguish between the effect on forward planning and the effect on managing 
financial risk across years.  The three year cycle may well enable public sector organisations 
to make better guesses as to the real value of expected budgets in each of the next three years 
than is the case with an annual expenditure round.  However that information does not make 
them better able to absorb the financial risk of committing in year one to pay a predetermined 
share of a contingent cost that may arise in year three due to change in the price of a drug, 
introduction of a new therapy, a change in demand or any other “unplanned” event that 
affects cost.  Because of the relatively smaller size of Primary Care Group budgets, we would Longer-Term Agreements for Health Care Services: What will they Achieve? 
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expect the between years financial risk of re-determination clauses to be even greater for 
PCGs than it is perceived to be for Health Authorities.
5 
 
We conclude that the present system has already evolved to encompass many of the activities 
which the Department of Health wishes to encourage through their policy shift (eg joint 
longer-term planning and strategy) and in this sense the impact of the policy of requiring 
longer-term agreements will be neutral.  However, we would advise a cautious approach to 
the implementation of rigid rules for longer-term financial agreements as this would deliver 
few benefits while forcing purchasers and providers into an activity which may have 









                                                 
5 See Carr-Hill, Rice and Smith (forthcoming) for a discussion of funding Primary Care Groups CHE Discussion Paper 157 
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Table 1  Contract Duration - number/proportion of contracts of different duration from 106 Health Authority contracts 
 
Health Authority  3 year  3 year rolling  1 year  Other  Notes 
1    
 
n=50 
All bar one main 
contract 
 
None  Most small contracts   2 year rolling for one main 
contract 
2 year rolling was with a main provider but year 2 was 





(see note)  All 9 main contracts with the 
exception of some specific 
named services within the 3 
year contract with the 
provider 
All small contracts with the 
exception of 3 small acute 
contracts which were 3 year 
rolling. 
 
One year contract for some 
specialist health promotion and for 
open access occupational therapy 
within a 3 year contract with Trust 
2 year rolling for 
“mainstream” health 
promotion 
The terms 3 year and 3 year rolling appear to be used 
interchangeably.  The core contract terms refer to all 
contracts as 3 year rolling but some of the contract 
documentation has 3 year written on it. 
 
The services for which there were 1 year contracts 
within a 3 year general Trust contract were either due to 
be reviewed, put out to tender or retracted. 
3  
  
n=9 (not a full set 
of small contracts) 
All 4 main 
contracts 
See next column  Four contracts stated they were 1 
year “within the context of a 3 year 
rolling contract” 
 
1 annual contract with provider 
outside Health Authority 
  One example of small contract with provider outside 
Health Authority was supplied but all others follow the 





All  4 main 
contracts 
 




  None    One example of small contract with provider outside  
Health Authority was supplied but all others follow the 
same format ie 3 year  
5  
(example only) 
  All main contracts      One example only was provided but all other contracts 




None  None, but see note  All contracts    All contracts were annual in this Health Authority, but 2 
with community Trusts stated that there was an 
intention to move towards a 3 year rolling contract with 
annual review. 
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Table 2  Contract Duration in isolated sample of Longer-term contracts. 
 
Contract Description  Duration  Notes 
A.  Health Authority and 
mental health Trust 
5 year  Refers to a single contract 
with a mental health Trust 
which ran from 1992 to 
1997 in order to affect a 
transfer of patients with 
learning difficulties to the 
community 
 
B.  Consortium of 
purchasers and acute Trust 
3 year  For provision of cardiac 
services only. 
 
C.  Health Authority and 
community Trust 
 
2 year rolling  For provision of 
community health 
services excluding 
specific parts of service 
covered by different 
contracts 
D.  3 Health Authorities 
and acute Trust 
 
3 year  For provision of all acute 
services.   
E.  Health Authority and 
Community Trust 
 
3 year  For provision of mental 
health services. 
 
Draft of general terms 
only 
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Table 3   “Rules” and Principles for adjusting Price and Activity over Time in 93 Longer-Term contracts 
   
Health 
Authority 
Price “Rules”?  Activity “Rules”?  Notes 
1 Annual  re-negotiation 
One contract states the “anticipated” cash limit for 
following year and lists factors to be considered when 
setting it next year (inflation, changes to non-recurrent 
funding in Health Authority).   
All other contracts say this year’s activity and price to 
be used as a “baseline” for future negotiations. 
Core contracting terms state that 
75% and 50% of year 1 activity is 
guaranteed as a minimum in years 
2 and 3 respectively.  These terms 
apply to most main providers. 
 
2.  Annual re-negotiation  
Contracts with main providers state that both parties 
recognise the “preferred status” of the other and thus 
expect the provider to ensure the prices it offers are as 
least as favourable as to others who may wish to 
purchase the same services (ie other Health Authorities, 
GPFHs etc).  If during the contract the provider offers 
or sells the services to a third party at prices lower than 
those in the contract, the Health Authority expects to be 
notified and normally offered the same terms 
Annual  The price clause is similar to the “most favoured nation” clauses 
contained in longer-term contracts in the private sector in some 
industries (eg gas).  They have been viewed by some as 
potentially  anti-competitive devices, but by others as an efficient 
means by which price adjustments can be made to reflect changing  
economic circumstances as it is assumed that new prices relate to 
changes in costs or demand which would otherwise be difficult to 
track.  It is not clear that this is the reasoning behind the Health 
Authority clause. 
3.  Annual re-negotiation  
One contract with a main provider states that funding 
for the following will include consideration of 
additional posts and extra theatre lists, and the 
recurrent nature of unfunded inflation.   However, it 
states that this is “unlikely” to involve any additional 
cash increase over current year. 





Price “Rules”?  Activity “Rules”?  Notes 
4.  Annual re-negotiation.   
States that this will reflect the recurring financial 
baseline with amendments made for inflation, costs of 
additional activity and “agreed” in-year cost pressures 
Annual  Contracts with non-local providers state that the annual re-
negotiation will reflect service changes which may arise as a result 
of acute services reviews taking place in those areas.  This 
presumably reflects the difficulty of devising even a general 
indicator of the factors likely to impact on price and activity 
during a period involving substantial service shifts.  Additionally, 
the Health Authority is likely to have far less control over the 
shifts occurring in distant areas than it does within it’s own 
boundaries. 
5.  Annual re-negotiation to reflect agreed changes in 
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ANNEX 1: Selection of Health Authorities, GP Fundholders and Interviewees 
 
A.  Selection of Health Authorities/GP Fundholders 
 
The duration and scope of the project did not allow for the collection of all contracts from all 
Health Authorities.  We therefore decided to limit our sample to two regions outside London 
from which we would choose a number of Health Authorities and GPFHs.  As all regions 
were likely to provide a good cross-section of Health Authorities with different 
characteristics, we chose two regions whose proximity would limit cost and time involved in 
fieldwork associated with project.  The following criteria were used to select Health 
Authorities within these regions: 
 
•  Population: an indicator of size; 
•  Revenue budget: an indicator of size/purchasing power; 
•  Number of main provider contractors: an indication of the number of contracts to be 
examined; 
•  Number of general practices (fundholding practices): examining the ratio would give an 
indication of the relative purchasing power of Health Authorities and GP fundholders; 
•  % acute/community expenditure split: included partly because the nature of the contract 
may vary depending upon whether the main provider is largely acute or community 
service-based. 
 
There were twenty-four Health Authorities in the two regions. 
 
Eight Health Authorities were initially selected (allowing for a 25% non-response/non-
compliance rate) and approached to participate in the study.  All of the GP fundholding 
practices within each selected Health Authority area were also approached to participate in 
the study. 
 
We requested copies of all contracts from the Health authorities and GPFHs in the study, 
explaining that although the project focused on longer-term contracts, part of the scope was 
to assess the extent to which longer-term contracts were used and that we required annual 
contracts for comparative purposes. 
 
B.  Response 
 
Although six Health Authorities agreed to send us their contract documentation, there was 
substantial variation in the documents which were seen as being part of the actual contract.  
For example, some Health Authorities sent us every service specification to which they refer 
in contracts, whilst others sent us only the contract schedules or one or two specifications as 
examples.  Some Health Authorities had “core” documents which contained details of their 
financial and contracting requirements which applied to all contracts; others had separate 
details for each provider.  Although this may reflect nothing more  interesting than the 
amount of photocopying that the Health Authorities were willing to undertake on our behalf, 
we believe some of it represents a genuine variation in what is understood by “contracting” at Longer-Term Agreements for Health Care Services: What will they Achieve? 
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both the Health Authority and Trust level in terms of the range and nature of the activities 
that are included as part of this process.   
 
Two Health Authorities sent us “representative” examples of their standard contract 
documents, rather than all the contracts as they stated that the format and all the terms and 
conditions were identical in every contract with their main providers.  One Health Authority 
supplied us with examples of main contracts and examples of those with distant or marginal 
providers. 
 
In total, we received 106 separate Health Authority contracts.  Additionally, the NHS 
Executive supplied us with some examples of longer-term contracts they had collected via a 
trawl around regional offices, which added 5 more to our sample. 
 
The response from GPFHs was less favourable.  This may have in part been due to the cost of 
photocopying (although we did offer to reimburse practices for this) but also because they 
believed the Health Authority held copies of all their contracts and would send them to us in 
one batch.  Although we did follow this up, it became clear that if the contracts were indeed 
held at Health Authority level, they were not all located in one place and we were unable to 
find anyone who could supply copies at the Health Authority level.  Thus we had to rely on 
the responses from the GPFHs.  In total, 47 practices responded and sent 177 contracts.  
Again, many of them said all their contracts followed an identical format, so sent only a 
single example.  A preliminary analysis of the fundholding contracts led us to expect that 
gathering further examples would not add substantially to the project and thus we did not 
attempt to send reminders. 
 
C.   Interviews 
 
Interviews were held with staff from each Health Authority in our sample (we included the 
Health Authority with one year contracts for comparative purposes) and from a Trust with 
which the Health Authority contracted.  The Trusts were selected as being a main provider of 
services to the Health Authority and also as representing a spectrum of experiences.  Two 
were mental health Trusts, two were non-teaching acute and two were teaching acute.  The 
individuals interviewed varied in terms of their position as we asked for someone who was 
involved in the contracting process with the specific Health Authority/Trust in question.  In 
general, the individuals in both Trusts and Health Authorities tended to be 
Directors/Assistant Directors of Planning, Commissioning or Contracting. 
 